Case Database

Browse and search landmark decisions indexed by jurisdiction, year, and legal field. Each entry includes full ratio, obiter, and critical evaluation.

Tort 1932 UK — House of Lords

Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562

Ratio: A manufacturer owes a duty of care to the ultimate consumer. Lord Atkin's neighbour principle founded the modern law of negligence.

Tort 1932 UK — House of Lords

Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562

The foundation of the modern law of negligence.

A manufacturer owes a duty of care to the ultimate consumer of their products. Lord Atkin established the 'neighbour principle' — you must take reasonable care to avoid acts which you can reasonably foresee would injure those closely and directly affected.

Lord Atkin's speech considered the broader moral question of who ought to be your 'neighbour' in law. This broader discussion proved enormously influential in expanding negligence into areas such as psychiatric harm and economic loss.

Prior to 1932, tort law generally required a contractual relationship before a duty of care could exist — the privity rule from Winterbottom v Wright (1842). Mrs Donoghue's claim against a ginger beer manufacturer she had no contract with was therefore radical. The House of Lords' 3-2 majority decision broke with Victorian precedent.

Still good law? Yes — Caparo v Dickman [1990] refined the test into three parts (foreseeability, proximity, fairness), but Donoghue remains the conceptual origin. In the digital age, courts increasingly apply the neighbour principle to software developers and data controllers, raising questions Lord Atkin could never have anticipated.

Criminal 1985 UK — House of Lords

R v Moloney [1985] AC 905

Ratio: Intention in murder requires foresight of death or serious harm as a virtual certainty. Lord Bridge's direction clarified the doctrine of oblique intent.

Criminal 1985 UK — House of Lords

R v Moloney [1985] AC 905

Oblique intent and the virtual certainty test in murder.

For a murder conviction, the mens rea of intention requires more than foresight of a likely consequence. The defendant must foresee death or grievous bodily harm as a virtual certainty of their actions. Mere foresight of probability is insufficient — it is only evidence from which a jury may infer intent.

Lord Bridge offered a two-stage "golden rule" direction: (1) Was death or serious harm a natural consequence of the defendant's act? (2) Did the defendant foresee it as such? Though this guidance was later criticised in R v Hancock [1986] for being misleading, it shaped the development of the virtual certainty test refined in R v Woollin [1998].

Before Moloney, the law on oblique intent was confused following DPP v Smith [1961], which controversially suggested an objective test for intention. Moloney re-established a subjective approach, asking what the defendant personally foresaw rather than what a reasonable person would have foreseen.

Development of the law: Moloney was refined by R v Nedrick [1986] and ultimately R v Woollin [1998] (HL), which confirmed that a jury is entitled — but not obliged — to find intention where the defendant foresaw death or GBH as virtually certain. The tension between a rule-based and jury-discretion approach remains academically debated. Applied to modern contexts such as cybercrime (e.g. launching a fatal ransomware attack), the virtual certainty test raises interesting questions about foresight in digital environments.

Cyber Law 2019 EU — CJEU

Google LLC v CNIL (Case C-507/17)

Ratio: The right to be forgotten under GDPR does not carry global territorial scope. De-listing obligations apply only to EU-accessible search versions.

Cyber Law 2019 EU — CJEU

Google LLC v CNIL (Case C-507/17)

The territorial reach of GDPR's right to be forgotten.

Article 17 of the GDPR (the right to erasure / right to be forgotten) does not require a search engine operator to carry out de-referencing on all versions of its search engine globally. The operator must de-reference on EU-country-code domain versions and take measures to prevent easy access from EU territory on non-EU versions.

The Court acknowledged that EU law does not prohibit a supervisory authority from requiring worldwide de-referencing where national law so permits. This leaves open the possibility of broader territorial reach in future regulatory action, and the Court encouraged international co-operation on this question.

This case arose from the landmark Google Spain SL v AEPD [2014] decision which first established the right to be forgotten under EU data protection law. The French data protection authority (CNIL) had ordered Google to apply de-listing globally, prompting this reference to the CJEU on the territorial scope question.

Digital sovereignty in tension: This decision illustrates the fundamental tension in internet regulation between the EU's rights-based model and the global, borderless nature of the web. Critics argue the ruling creates a loophole — EU residents can circumvent de-listing via VPN. Post-Brexit, the UK's own data protection framework (UK GDPR) raises fresh questions about whether British courts will follow this interpretation or diverge. The case remains central to any discussion of GDPR's extraterritorial reach under Article 3.

Animal Welfare 2022 England & Wales

Animal Welfare (Sentience) Act 2022

Key provision: Vertebrates and certain invertebrates (including octopuses and crabs) are recognised as sentient beings. Ministers must consider animal welfare in policy-making.

Animal Welfare 2022 England & Wales

Animal Welfare (Sentience) Act 2022

Legislative recognition of animal sentience in UK domestic law.

The Act establishes the Animal Sentience Committee — an independent body charged with scrutinising government policy for its effects on animal welfare. Under s.2, the Committee may produce reports on whether ministers have had 'all due regard' to the welfare of sentient animals. Crucially, the Act extends sentience recognition beyond vertebrates to include decapod crustaceans and cephalopod molluscs (e.g. crabs, octopuses) following scientific evidence from the London School of Economics.

Post-Brexit, the EU's recognition of animal sentience under Article 13 TFEU no longer directly applied in UK law. The 2022 Act was introduced to fill this gap and arguably goes further than its EU counterpart by creating an active scrutiny mechanism rather than merely a declaratory principle. It sits alongside the Animal Welfare Act 2006, which governs individual criminal liability for animal cruelty.

The scientific and philosophical basis for animal sentience has developed significantly since Peter Singer's 'Animal Liberation' (1975) and Jeremy Bentham's earlier observation that the morally relevant question regarding animals is not whether they can reason, but whether they can suffer. The 2022 Act represents a significant legislative shift in how UK law treats non-human welfare interests.

How effective is the Act? Critics note that the Committee's reports are not legally binding — ministers are required to 'have regard to' animal welfare but are not obliged to follow the Committee's recommendations. This arguably creates a toothless watchdog. Comparatively, Germany's Basic Law (Art. 20a GG) constitutionally protects animals, giving animal welfare interests enforceable legal weight. A comparative analysis suggests the UK's approach, while progressive, falls short of the strongest international models. Future reform may be needed if the Act is to meaningfully constrain government policy.

Tort 1990 UK — House of Lords

Caparo Industries plc v Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605

Ratio: The three-stage Caparo test for establishing a duty of care: foreseeability of damage, proximity of relationship, and whether it is fair, just and reasonable to impose a duty.

Tort 1990 UK — House of Lords

Caparo Industries plc v Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605

The three-stage test for duty of care in negligence.

A duty of care arises where: (1) it is reasonably foreseeable that the defendant's careless act would cause harm to the claimant; (2) there is a relationship of proximity between the parties; and (3) it is fair, just and reasonable in all the circumstances to impose a duty. All three requirements must be satisfied — no single element is sufficient alone.

Lord Bridge emphasised that the law should develop incrementally and by analogy with established categories, rather than by application of a single overarching principle. This "incremental approach" was a deliberate retreat from the broader neighbour principle in Donoghue and the two-stage Anns test (Anns v Merton LBC [1978]) which had produced unpredictable expansion of liability.

Caparo arose in the context of negligent auditing — Caparo acquired a company in reliance on accounts prepared by Dickman (auditors) and suffered losses when the accounts proved misleading. The House of Lords held the auditors owed no duty of care to potential investors, as the accounts were prepared for existing shareholders as a class, not for takeover purposes. The case resolved doctrinal uncertainty that had accumulated since Anns v Merton Borough Council [1978].

Is Caparo still the leading test? Its status has been questioned. In Robinson v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire [2018], the Supreme Court suggested that where a case falls within an established category, the Caparo test need not be applied at all. Lord Reed indicated that novel cases should develop incrementally rather than mechanically applying the three-stage test. Academic commentary suggests Caparo remains important as a framework but is no longer the exclusive gateway to duty of care analysis — a significant doctrinal shift worth noting in any essay on negligence.